

MEDIA AND MEMORY CONSTRUCTION WITHIN GLOBALIZATION: TRANS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON HISTORY IN EUROPE

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In describing what a "nation" is, Anthony Smith lists these constitutive features: "a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members" (Smith, 1991: 14). He highlights the ethnic roots and - in accordance with Anderson (1983-2006) - the constructive aspects of nation-building which are associated with history in three ways: via local traditions, via narratives of origin, and the remembrance of meaningful past events. Without commemoration, a community has no orientation in the present and cannot develop concepts for the future. Territory, economy and the political systems are the "hardware", public culture - created and communicated through the media - is the "software" of national identity. The globalization of economy (Castells, 2000, 2001) and of the information flow in the press, on television and - strongest - on the internet expand the offers of historical interpretations enormously. This means a challenge for all nations, be it as a resource of enrichment, be it as a factor disturbing national stability.

History and national identity - The European case

Usually, historiography follows national narratives about the foundation of the state, historical victories, economic achievements

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and political action challenged by societal problems. The national history is more a less made up of a story of success. This applies particularly to Europe in the period of nation-state building during the 19th century (White, 1973, Hobsbawm 1990) when economic, political and cultural advances gave Europeans a feeling of self-confidence and power. The "colonisation" of countries in Africa, America and the Far East seemed to the most British, French or Spanish up to World War I (1914-1918) to be a "natural consequence of superiority". Between 1918 and 1938 - the time of the big economic crises and the uprising of fascist movements - the stories of success and progress faded. And after World War II, triggered by the German Nazi-regime, traumatic experiences connected with the Holocaust (around 7 million murdered Jews), concentration and extermination camps, deportation, ethnic cleansing, mass shootings and bombings renewed the focus on stressful negative events from either the viewpoint of the victors or the vanquished. This affected how Europeans understand a nation: as a community of common action as well as of common suffering (Levy & Sznajder, 2006) and also of reflecting what one's own action means for others. Some nations in Europe, especially the main perpetrators in World Wars I and II, Germany and Austria, therefore revised their heroic national narratives and implemented self-criticism towards an exaggerated nationalism and chauvinism. Israel, which owed its foundation not least to the Holocaust, developed a concept of national identity to prevent a second Holocaust for all times to come, via the combination of an intensive culture of remembering and strong military power against potential enemies in the Middle East. And Russia, which as a victim of Hitler's aggression suffered the greatest human losses in World War II, contributed to the victorious Anti-Hitler Coalition and after the victory focused on national greatness and military defence capability. Also the three Western Powers in the Anti-Hitler Coalition (US, Great Britain, France) after the

confrontation with the Nazi-aggression wanted to restrain aggressors in the future. But, they saw their former coalition partner (the Soviet Union) as potential future aggressor, who spread communism and its own governance all over the world. News from the GULag seemed to justify drawing parallels between Hitler and Stalin (Snyder, 2010). As a consequence, stemming from one historical event, but with several diverse interpretations thereof, a new "Cold War" emerged that would split Europe for more than 40 years. Apparently, memory construction from divergent viewpoints of nations or nation groups may create or perpetuate inter-nation conflicts.

The question is whether and under what conditions historical commemorating can both stabilize national identity and help to manage conflicts in a peaceful way which impedes an uncivilized relapse and improves the conditions for a humane coexistence and collaboration. The European Union claimed to be an order of peace and to serve peace-keeping in Europe. During the "Cold War" this was disputed because of the European division. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the expansion of the European Union, observers could believe for a short time that the door for a real European peace-keeping order was now open. But already the wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990ies indicated the return of historical armed nationalism in Europe accompanied by bloody use of weapons. And the current crisis in the Ukraine shows the danger of a revival of Cold-War thoughts and "old" enemy images related with memories of fascist aggression and anti-human breaches of civilization in Nazi-times. Remarkably enough, the protesters of Kyiv in January and February 2014 compared the Ukrainian president Yanukovich and the Russian president Putin depicted on posters with Adolf Hitler; while Putin stressed repeatedly the Nazi influence in the "Euromaydan" movement. Also the former foreign minister of the US, Hilary Clinton, compared Crimea's accidence to the Russian Federation with

Germany's annexation of Austria and Poland in World War II; meanwhile some Western European politicians saw similarities to the beginning of World War I when the former leaders acted like "sleepwalkers" and "involuntarily" caused the big catastrophe which killed at least 15 million people (Clark 2012).


The European example proves that the use of historical interpretation patterns gives no guarantee for a conflict-moderating political practice, especially when single events in the past are taken out of the historical context and the connection to the present is incidental and arbitrary without critical reflection about the time gap and the differences in circumstances. A variety of national interests and views may reinforce the fight for history and the fight with historical arguments. There is no chance and no need to assimilate differences between nations' historical views, but it is absolutely necessary to curtail the anti-humanistic potential of national commemoration practices and make it accessible for perspective-sharing with others. Apparently, we need a method of remembering correctly and communicating history within the nation states and in the trans-national space. The challenge is to minimize arbitrariness in the journalistic practice through methodological and ethical commitment and to transform the international historical discourse from nationalist constriction to reflexive patriotism including self-criticism and cosmopolitan views.

An Attempt to integrate European divergences

In the context of the eastward enlargement of the European Union (Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia etc.) in the last years, the attempts were reinforced to bridge different national perspectives on history and to define a core zone of memory construction which should be a condition for entrance for new EU-members and should give the older ones an instigation for self-critical thinking on historical interpretation patterns.

The German social scientist, Claus Leggewie, suggest a seven-circle concept of European memory with the Holocaust in its center.

Figure 1: European Circles of Memory



Adapted from Leggewie (2011: 14)

There is general agreement that the Holocaust, i.e. the genocide of the European Jews, is to be regarded as the crucial breach of civilization of the 20th century which is to be avoided in the future at all costs. In this sense, the Holocaust can be seen as the negative founding myth of the European Union (EU), providing an ethical foundation beyond its economic basis. It commits the EU-members to keep alive the memory of the Holocaust, to prosecute anti-Semitism and to protect minorities in

one's own country. Surprisingly enough, this was implemented very successfully in Germany, even though the majority of those people mainly responsible for the genocide came from there. The center position of the Holocaust is not only justified by its sheer monstrosity, but concerns also all other memory circles if they also represent crimes against humanity such as ethnic cleansings and mass murder, wars of aggression, colonial exploitation and violent repression. The universalization of Holocaust references has certainly contributed to the Germans becoming especially enthusiastic Europeans who argue from a moral viewpoint. A similar development in Turkey could not be determined up till now, as the Turkish government in their talks about EU accession so far has refused to acknowledge that the mass murder of the Armenians during World War I were a "genocide". The Turkish are afraid of the moral implications connected with the term "genocide". From their point of view, such a labeling is not compatible with Turkish national pride, which is still dominated by a narrative of one's own grandeur. This example shows that the German model of remembrance with its extremely self-critical component can not readily be transferred to all other nations - or only at the cost of potentially disintegrating effects in Europe.

Not only violent events are being associated with the Holocaust, but also the *migration history* of Europe, since the deportations had an impact on the EU regarding free travel and residence as important goods. Right-wing populist parties in Austria, France and Holland, however, show that the remembrance consensus in this respect is beginning to crumble. They refuse - and with them a large part of the population - to deduce an up-to-date ethical imperative regarding tolerance towards any kind of migration from the Holocaust experience. The mainly economic motives of the migrants who move between European countries or into Europe point to a principle limit for the moral education intended by remembrance work. The factual

connection between historical event and maxim for action needs to be apparent and readily understood by everyone.

The GULag-remembrance is controversial for other reasons - not because of the undisputedly questionable nature of the degrading practices discussed there, but because Russia so far has not been adequately included in the European unification process. Especially the new EU-members which used to belong to the former Soviet Union (Baltic Republics) or were part of the socialist camp outside the Soviet Union (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) connect their GULag remembrance with a strong anti-Russian affect which indirectly, via the updating of their interests of national security (accession to NATO, rearmament at the Eastern border), has an excluding effect on Russia. While the integration of Germany as the main culprit of the Holocaust has long since been achieved, the integration of Russia into the European remembrance architecture has yet to take place; even though the crimes of Stalinism have been officially recognized in Russia since the 20th party congress of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and present no obstacle in principle to being a member of European remembrance culture that is self-critical in many ways. The exclusion of Russia from the European remembrance discourse also appears to be a grave deficit, as the backslide into the "black and white" way of thinking of the "Cold War" and the danger of a hot war in connection with the crisis in Ukraine can at least partly be traced back to failures in memory work.

How can a realistic stocktaking of European memory modalities be carried out empirically-scientifically? How to differentiate between a peaceful-cooperative communication and a hostile, conflict-escalating communication? Which historical topics and which communicative designs help to convey human values? Which communication increases prejudices towards other nations? This leads us to the follow-up question how constructive conclusions for the

journalistic practice can be drawn from the potentially discovered problem areas of history conveyance in the media. The MIH-model, which is described in the next paragraph, was developed at the University of Vienna. It contains 8 interconnected levels of imparting history to the public, including empirical indications for journalistic success. The model is suitable to compare single communications to each other respectively regarding a normative benchmark. Furthermore the model is applicable for international comparison to look at the influence of national identity on the conveyance of historical topics and, vice versa, to study the influence of communicating history on the quality and stability of national identity. After introducing the model it will be applied to the reception of a Holocaust documentary ("Night and Fog", director: Alain Resnais, 1955; Lindeperg, 2007) in Austria, Russia and Israel.

Multidimensional Imparting of History - a model for journalistic quality

The model "Multidimensional Imparting of History" (MIH) is divided in a structural and a process-related part. The structural modelling refers to *levels of information processing* during the reception of media contents (e.g. historical knowledge and interpretation, identity construction, political lessons and humanitarian value orientation) which are associated with dimensions of media effects in the reception output. The process-related interpretation refers to *steps of information processing* which begins with a first impression forming and establishing a certain quality of receptive participation; it continues with selective information processing up to the elaborative stadium of active understanding and deriving meanings.

MIH shows past - and present-related levels of information processing. The first four levels focus on past events, the cognitive activity is conscious and seen as "explicit" remembering. In the context of imparting history this includes the conscious

commemoration of historical events with social and societal meanings. But socially relevant is also the “implicit memory” (Schacter, 1987; Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2007; Voss & Paller, 2008), which coins the reception of the present without the need for conscious acts of memory (see the levels 5 to 8). The “implicit memory” is defined as effective moment of the past in the present. If we had learned to play piano in the youth, it is not necessary to remember the process when we apply the stored knowledge to playing piano in the present. Similarly, the history of a nation is objectively present in the current political opinions and aims. It is not necessary to explicitly remember traumatic war experiences to form a peace-oriented political issue. The MIH-model shows how the explicit remembrance (e.g. of the Holocaust) and its implicit application to current opinions and humanitarian value orientation interact.

Structural MIH-Model: Multidimensional Imparting of History

I. Processes relating to the past:

1. Factual knowledge transfer
2. Selection/deduction of messages
3. Modification of interpretation patterns
4. Building of historical awareness
 - a. Active search for information
 - b. Abstraction of historical images
 - c. Construction of historical identity

Explicit
Memory

II Processes relating to the present:

5. Adjustment of collective danger awareness
6. Formation of political opinions
7. Lifeworld projections
8. Imparting of Humanity
 - a. Prejudice decrease
 - b. Aggression control
 - c. Communitas skills
 - d. Political humanitas

Implicit
Memory

Adapted from Grimm (2012)

We assume that *knowledge transfer* (dimension 1) takes place on the recipient’s side as a selection of “facts” from the communications and influences, via a gain in insight, the *interpretation of historic events* in the sense of D2 (selection/ deduction of messages) and D3 (modification of interpretation patterns). In addition, factual knowledge presented by the media stimulates the formation of historical awareness (D4) by activating further interest in information on the respective historical topic while at the same time giving an incentive for a generalized abstracted view of history (What does history mean in general? What is the meaning of history appropriation in general?). At the threshold between past- and present-related history appropriations, the dimensions D1 through D4 individually or collectively affect the interpretation of the present, which shows in *collective danger awareness* (D5) and *political opinions* (D6) linked to the past. The focusing on risk perception and political opinion formation can theoretically be explained by the fact that collective memory and social awareness is influenced by dangers and traumata lived through by oneself or by earlier generations.

Lifeworld projections (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, 1983; Bakardjieva, 2005) of history (D7) mark a special case in the MIH-model. The past-related reconstruction of collectively relevant questions forms the starting point of all history references. This implies in principle an open time frame which is put in an individualized lifeworld context. A restriction of the time frame of historic events to biographic life spans is connected with this; at the same time, imparting of history is being opened for a whole number of individual appropriation options and the access to historical material is made easier.

Imparting of humanity (D8) and lifeworld-oriented history appropriations are insofar similar as both contain abstract idealizations of historic events and interpretations which potentially (not

necessarily) converge. Especially in the transnational expansion of history perspectives lies the opportunity to use traumata, wars and destructive conflicts of the past productively to advance the civilizing process (Elias, 2000). It reproduces the harmony and social integration the individual needs and desires in his everyday world on a collective level. *Imparting of humanity* is divided into four sub-dimensions within the MIH-model: (1) *prejudice decrease* in the sense of a decrease in "group-focused enmity" (GFE, cf. Zick et al., 2008) and (2) *aggression control* which becomes manifest in the decrease of reactive aggression and violence legitimation as well as the preference for compromise-oriented conflict management (Fahrenberg, Hampel & Selg, 1994; Grimm 1999, 2006). In an expansion of these defensive variants of humanity impartment, (3) *communitas skills* and (4) *political humanity* are equivalent to dispositions which foster the individual's intention to actively stabilize social conditions of (relative) humanity or to realize them in the future. *Communitas skills* are defined as the *disposition for transnational and trans-ethnic community-building*. *Political humanitas* includes by definition the *tendency towards cosmopolitan problem-solving* (Nussbaum, 1997, 2001; Hare, 2009; Higgins, 2009), with the three components: (1) willingness to give humanitarian help independent of geographic and cultural closeness, (2) commitment for the politically persecuted in one's own country and around the world and (3) engagement for universal human rights.

The dynamic components of the MIH-model imply an initial step of *impression forming* (pleasant vs. unpleasant, tragic vs. funny, interesting vs. non-interesting, relevant vs. irrelevant) to describe the beginning of the reception process when individuals in the public encounter media contents. At the same time, they are establishing a certain *receptive participation* on a scale of being fully entangled by the story ("high narrative engagement") or of feeling utter repulsion

and showing resistance against the design or the content of the media ("low narrative engagement"). Particularly in the case of traumatic historical events, we expect that representations in the media are able to provoke both *narrative engagement* and *resistance*. This ambivalence is justified if the media content caused "high involvement", which is defined as amount of created relations between media content and the recipients' personality and social life during the reception process. *Involvement* as a second type of *receptive participation* is essential for the conveyance of messages and the persuasion of the recipients. Building on *impression forming* and *receptive participation*, the actual information process is started with two components: (a) selection of relevant information from the media formula, (b) elaboration of deeper understanding and deriving meanings and conclusions. Knowledge transfer, interpretation of the historical events and change of interpretation patterns (on level one to three of the structural MIH-model, see above) are mostly realised via *selective information processing*, but sometimes derived messages are included which are not explicitly part of the media formula. All other steps need to have elaborative shares or they are completely the result of *elaborative information processing*. Particularly, the formation of political opinions (level 6) and the conveyance of human value orientations (level 8) depend on elaborative activities of the recipients and cannot be implemented mechanically. In order to convey history in an effective way that is at the same time promoting human ethics, it is important to let people "experience" the desired effects within communication and not simply present them as a piece of instruction. The value of the experience is increased by emotional images (such as violence, suffering, mourning), but should not exceed the critical limit of stress resistance of the audience, as in this case receptive participation is inhibited and the whole process of history impartment may fail.

Added to the narrow circle of imparting history defined by the MIH-model are further (external) processes of elaborative processing which contain amongst others effects on *value hierarchy* and *national identity*. These can be seen as additional indicators for humanitarian value orientation and non-chauvinistic forms of history conveyance. The combination of patriotic attachment and critical self-reflection after a communication of historical topics points to a trans-nationally compatible form of history appropriation. We assume that the presentation of traumatic historical events as well as the heroic coping with it has an influence on national identity. In the critical reflection of nationalistic constriction (walls-up politics or the feeling of generalized superiority over other nations) we see as much a gain in humanity and peace-promotion as in the case of a cosmopolitan extension of one's own national identity.

All parameters of the MIH-model which are structural and related to the course of the process (as well as their extension regarding value hierarchy and national identity) can be operationalized within empirical studies or adapted to the respective question. *Impression forming* and *receptive participation* are measured with the help of standardized tests after the presentation of the communication stimulus (e.g. film, newspaper article, video game). The eight structural MIH-stages are being measured by using a pre-post design. This means that the participants fill in a questionnaire on attitudes on the MIH-dimensions. After one to three days, a communication stimulus (such as a film or newspaper article) is offered for reception. Immediately after the reception, the same questions on attitudes are being asked again. The difference between the answers before and after the reception is regarded as effect. With the help of statistical significance tests, we can tell whether the difference occurred by pure chance or was indeed caused by the respective communication. These differences result in short-term effects which can turn into long-term

effects, provided that similar communications are being used in the future.

The pre-post design enables us to draw conclusions on which MIH-dimensions a communication meets journalistic quality standards in the area of history impartment. On the other hand, deviations of the measured effects of defined quality standards show the deficits a communication has. This can then be used to improve the journalistic product (and similar products). We see another major advantage in the fact that by this procedure history impartment can at least partly be taken out of the ideological dispute, as the MIH-model offers an objective, value-based, yet flexible frame of reference for national and trans-national discourse. The objectives for history impartment are defined individually by each user on the eight MIH-dimensions, including what "impartment of humanity" is supposed to mean in each individual case. This way, everyone can improve their specific application according to their specific empirical results and is still encouraged to reflect upon it in relation to other users (e.g. other nations). MIH makes *historical perspective sharing* possible which in our view per se has a peace-promoting quality.

After this excursion on the theoretical-methodological foundation for a research perspective in the field of media-based history impartment, in the last section of the article the empirical fruitfulness of the approach shall be discussed. By presenting the results from an international study on the effects of Holocaust communications which we carried out in Austria, Russia, Israel and other countries, we take up again the questions asked in the first section of the article with regard to transnational history impartment in Europe. With the equipment from the MIH-model, we pursue the question if and to what extent a convergence of history appropriation with regard to the Holocaust during World War II in Europe is possible which unites the descendants of German and Austrian "perpetrators" with the

descendants of the Jewish “victims” in a mutual human perspective. Of special interest is the question if the Russian perspective - which up till now is in conflict with the European memory culture - is not after all already located within the European trans-national space and can be used for a consolidation of European integration.

Communicating the Holocaust in Austria, Russia, and Israel

The visualizing of history in the media consists to a large extent of terrifying images associated with war, catastrophes and suffering. Terrifying images in historical contexts can have ambivalent effects:

- Enlightenment vs. traumatization,
- Increased attention and deeper information processing vs. aversion against reception of similar contents,
- Conveyance of human values vs. dehumanization of enemies.

Therefore, the question arises in what way stressing images of the Holocaust must be presented in order to unfold their enlightening and humanist effect without being excessively burdening on the recipients. One important means for bridging the gap between past and present with regard to the historical event is to use witnesses to history as mediators for the terrifying images from the Nazi regime.

Our research questions regarding the Holocaust documentary “Night and Fog” are:

- To what extent do Austrians, Germans and viewers of other nationalities show negative emotions when confronted with terrifying images in the Holocaust documentary “Night and Fog”? Can witnesses to history help reduce emotional strain?
- How do the terrifying images influence receptive participation and knowledge transfer? What are the consequences for reception and information processing if witnesses to history are being added?
- Does “Night and Fog” trigger persuasion effects which increase or decrease humanitarian attitudes? Is there a moderating effect associated with witnesses to history?

- Does it make a difference for receptive participation and persuasive effects if the witness is a former victim or a perpetrator of the Nazi regime? And how does the nationality of the viewer influence receptive participation and persuasive output?

For the international comparative study we created several versions of “Night and Fog”: in version 1 there were no witnesses to history, in the versions 2-5 there were different types of witnesses to history (representatives of victims and perpetrators of the Nazi regime).

“Night and Fog”, added witnesses to history



* Highly acclaimed documentary by French director Alain Resnais “Night and Fog” (narrative commentary: Paul Celan, film score: Hanns Eisler)

Altogether, 650 people took part in the surveys in Austria, Russia and Israel (Austria= 253, Russia=192, Israel=205). All surveys together add up to 1.800 participants so far.

Impression forming and receptive participation

Participants assessed the Holocaust documentary to be highly realistic, frightening, tragic and emotionally touching which indicates a high degree of emotional strain. This applies to Germans and

Austrians as well as to Russians and Israelis (Grimm & Grill, 2013a, 2013b). The highest emotional strain was, as expected, found in Israel, the lowest in Russia. Witnesses to history usually decreased feelings of stress in the recipients. Witnesses to history encourage a reflexive mood regarding the historical events in the recipients (thinking about the historical event, comparing past and present), which generally decreases stress reactions. The exception of the rule were witnesses to history in the role of victims in the Israel study. Here the victim-witnesses increased the stress reaction of the recipients.

The dismay of the Israeli viewers was not only greater than that of the other nationalities, apparently it was also increased by the witnesses to history. We must not forget that many participants had lost family members in the Holocaust so that the process of comparing induced by the Holocaust survivors made them feel even deeper pain. This points to the limits of confronting subjects with historical film material if recipients are personally affected to a high extent. Interestingly, the quality of information was rated higher in film groups with witnesses to history than in the group without witnesses. Apart from the higher cognitive complexity that a communication with different time levels contains, also the stress reduction by trend which occurred in non-Israeli viewers when employing witnesses may have played a role. Concluding, we can say: Witnesses to history may decrease stress and increase the quality of the information given.

Receptive participation, that is *narrative engagement* (the feeling of being drawn into the story) and *involvement* (connection between historical event and the recipient's lifeworld) were by far the highest in Israel. Yet, the Russian results prove wrong the common notion (expressed by several older people in Russia) that the Holocaust was of no interest for young Russians and that an active and engaged participation would not take place. Also in Russia did the intensity of receptive participation surpass the average level for TV documentaries.

Quite revealing are the divergences between *narrative engagement* and *involvement* that we found in Austrian and German recipients. Witnesses to history increased the possibilities for recipients to create references to their own life. Yet, under the same conditions, the immersive pull of the story decreased. Neither in Russia nor in Israel did we find such a divergence within receptive participation. Apparently, the witnesses to history provoked cognitive resistance in German and Austrian recipients who understood themselves as "descendants of perpetrators" and inhibited the "immersion into the story" to some extent.

Limits of humanity transfer

The MIH-indicators for *imparting of humanity* (decrease of prejudices, aggression control and the willingness to compromise in conflict situations, as well as increase in *communitas* skills and *humanitas*) were different in the individual countries.

- Among Germans and Austrians we found a decrease of prejudices after the reception of the Holocaust documentary (especially prejudices against Jews and strangers in general). At the same time, aggression was reduced, aggression control as well as the willingness to compromise in conflict situations was increased. There was no increase regarding *communitas* skills and *political humanitas*. On the contrary, the willingness to celebrate with other ethnic groups was reduced. The readiness to support the poor and needy e.g. by donations was increased, yet the willingness to fight for human rights was decreased by the terrifying images of the Holocaust documentary. One plausible reason for this is moral overstrain caused by shock regarding the breach of civilization especially in the descendants of the Nazi-perpetrators. In this case a misanthropic view about the nature of humanity as well as a feeling of collective guilt might have been produced or reinforced that undermine an unrestrained and total commitment for the defence of human rights.

- Also in Israel decreased prejudices after the reception of the Holocaust documentary, namely with regard to sexism and anti-Semitism. The reduction of prejudices about gender was also found in other populations. The finding might best be interpreted as a protest-effect when faced with the tortured bodies in the extermination camps, which discredited all forms of bodily devaluation. As a result, the recipients actively drew their consequences and wanted to renounce sexist prejudices more than before the reception. The decrease in anti-Semitism can only partly be attributed to the Israelis of Arabic origin in our sample. Other groups in Israel showed the same effect. We therefore conclude that prejudices do not only concern out-groups, but also to some extent one's own group. Anti-Semitic attitudes at a rather low level were further decreased by the reception of the Holocaust documentary. With regard to aggression control, the results are ambivalent. On the one hand, reactive aggression post-receptively decreased in Israel as well as a preference for compromises in case of conflicts increase. But, on the other hand, the use of political force, especially concerning foreign affairs, is seen as more justified. In some respects the Holocaust reception reinforces peaceful conflict behaviour, in others it might legitimate political violence in the current conflict between Israeli and Palestinians.

- As was already the case with the Germans and Austrians, also the Israeli recipients of "Night and Fog" did not increase their *communitas* skills. Also the "descendants of the victims of the Holocaust" prefer to celebrate amongst themselves instead of with strangers after watching the documentary. In contrast to the "descendants of the perpetrators", the Israeli recipients feel obliged to a certain degree to become actively engaged for *political humanitas*. This concerns primarily the willingness to stand up for the politically persecuted and donate money to starving people. But also the Israelis feel little motivation after the Holocaust-reception to fight for human rights in general.

- In contrast to Germans, Austrians and Israelis, the Russian participants were all the more ready to fight for *political humanitas* after the Holocaust documentary than before. In this case, the terrifying images are like a call for the fight against international injustice. Especially the engagement for international peace is massively increased, as it is part of the Soviet Union's historical experience in World War II. Still, also in Russia there is no increase in *communitas* skills. The shocking images and the monstrosity of the crimes seem to universally inhibit a trans-national and inter-ethnic opening in people's emotions. The general trend of the Holocaust reception is the increase in willingness to compromise as well as the decrease of aggression and readiness to fight. In this respect, the Russian Holocaust reception is well in the European mainstream of moderate conflict management.

Expansion of national identity

National identity is constructed by discourse (Wodak et al. 2009) and significantly determined by media communications. According to the DNI-concept (Grimm et al., 2012) it is made up of three dimensions: a) bonding with the country and the people living there (= patriotism as the basis of national identity), b) a nationalistic constriction of perspectives by ingroup-focussing, which manifest in convictions of general superiority, a walls-up policy and in extreme cases also in the approval of military force (= nationalism), and c) a reflexive component that includes self-criticism, understanding for other nations and the high esteem of supra-national institutions (= cosmopolitanism). The memories of decisive historical events with or without the heroic overcoming of national crises are an important incentive for changes in the component framework of national identity.

It is hardly surprising that the reception of the Holocaust documentary "Night and Fog" has an influence on the identity formation of Germans and Austrians as well as of Israelis and

Russians. The different effects reflect in what way the Holocaust is connected with a person's own historical experiences and thereby shapes and reshapes updates of national identity.

- Especially Germans and to a lesser extent also Austrians reacted to the Holocaust documentary with an *attenuation of nationalist components* of their identity. The film induced feelings of guilt about the participation of their compatriots in mass murders which then resulted in a self-critical watchfulness with regard to narrow-minded "friend or foe"- modes of thought and the generalized devaluation of minorities. Decreased were also aggressive and superiority-based identity constructions which made the persecution of the Jews in Nazi-Germany possible in the first place. Also *patriotism*, the positive bonding with one's own compatriots, decreased by tendency in Germans and Austrians. One can see this as a problematic element in dealing with the Holocaust which still shakes the very foundations of national identity of the "descendants of the perpetrators" even 60 years after the critical event.

- In contrast, the nationalist dimension of national identity slightly increased in Russia after the Holocaust reception. Especially the acceptance of military force to defend one's own country was valued higher post-receptively. We interpret this as a reflection of the "Great Patriotic War" which was forced upon the Red Army by Hitler-Germany, but was finally victoriously fought. Thinking in terms of one's own superiority was not increased. The Russian recipients resisted the temptation to connect the Holocaust with the victory over Hitler-Germany and come to a conclusion of Russian superiority. This undemonstrative identity construction goes well together with the highly significant expansion of the cosmopolitan dimension. The Russian recipients of "Night and Fog" increased their openness towards other nations and their readiness to test national viewpoints for their supra-national compatibility.

- Similarly, the cosmopolitan dimension of Israeli identity was expanded as well. This was in so far surprising because in Israel there is one conclusion from the traumatic experiences from the Holocaust: Never again be a defenseless victim, therefore demonstrate readiness for combat! Yet, we found no increase in nationalist or aggressively chauvinist attitudes, rather, a slight decrease. Only the patriotic bonding with one's own compatriots increased slightly, yet also not significantly. At the same time, cosmopolitanism increased to a maximum extent and even surpassed the highly significant value we found in the Russian sample. This validates a result by Gavriely-Nuri and Lachover (2012) who, by analyzing obituaries in Israel, observed a trend towards a cosmopolitan re-interpretation of the Holocaust which replaces earlier nationalist and military readings.

The cosmopolitan expansion of national identity through the Holocaust reception is, as we could see, no specific Israeli feature, but was found in all researched countries, in each case in its specific national form. While the "descendants of the Nazi-perpetrators" reacted to "Night and Fog" above all with a self-critical reduction of nationalist ways of thinking, the Russians (as the attacked nation) and Israelis (as the main victims of the Holocaust) showed a strongly cosmopolitan alignment in their identity construction. In the Russian subjects, there was also an aspect of readiness for military defense which secured survival for the Soviet Union during WW II. The Israelis renounced such an interpretation of the Holocaust experience - maybe also because in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict it has not been possible to establish peace by military means for over 60 years now.

Conclusion

The MIH-model has proven its worth in the analysis of European remembrance culture. In the comparison of different communication versions and countries, there were plausibly interpretable findings with regard to receptive participation as well as with regard to the

differential humanity transfer. Using the example of the Holocaust documentary "Night and Fog", we could show that witnesses to history in the role of "victim" and "perpetrator" play an important part for history impartment, especially when dealing with traumatic historical experiences. Witnesses to history have a stress-reducing effect and make it easier for young people to establish a connection between the past (which they have not experienced themselves) and their current life world. In individual cases, the confrontation with terrifying historical images such as those of the Holocaust can also create a pull effect and draw young people into the story. Sometimes the addition of witnesses to history inhibits this process. In the international comparison, as postulated here, the Holocaust was confirmed as a central element in European remembrance culture insofar as all researched countries, despite their different national perspectives, agreed on the humanistic tendency of the conclusions. But there were also limits to humanity transfer that became apparent and that were connected to empathic or moral overstrain.

The main research results were:

Imparting of humanity generally took place as

- a) decrease of prejudices towards foreigners,
- b) decrease of reactive aggression,
- c) development of compromise-oriented conflict behaviour.

Imparting of humanity took place selectively as

- a) political Humanitas only in Russia,
- b) increase of cosmopolitanism in Israel and Russia, but not in Austria and Germany.

Imparting of humanity didn't take place as

- a) transcultural Communitization,
- b) global moral responsibility.

Summarizing, the results strongly suggest that the Holocaust memories consolidate civilizing and humanitarian values. The limits

of imparting humanity are assigned to emotional and moral overstrain, which can be controlled by appropriate journalistic design devices. This applies to all researched countries alike.

The basic concordance between Germany, Austria, Russia and Israel is remarkable, if you take into consideration the diverse gaps between the national descendants of "perpetrators" and "victims", respective between former "enemies" in the "Cold War". Apart from the victim-offender-mediation, the bridging function of the Holocaust remembrance in Russia seems to be of great importance for international relations and peacekeeping - all the more because the current crisis in the Ukraine opens up new rifts in Europe. The trans-national efficacy of Holocaust remembrance and the cosmopolitan expansion of national identity released by it could be a catalyst for a new humanistic order of peace, especially if the European nations (and beyond) are willing to strengthen historical perspective-sharing beyond nationalism.

Perspectives:

We see further possible applications of the MIH-model in international comparative studies with regard to the American War against Vietnam: a) Vietnamese community in Vienna in comparison to Viennese locals, b) Vietnamese compared with Europeans, c) Europeans compared with Americans. Also the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be predestined for transnational perspective sharing by dividing Muslim and Christian recipient groups. Finally, one could analyze reception modes of the "Cold War" of Americans and Russians and include sub-comparisons between Eastern Europeans and Western Europeans. The trans-nationalization of history today is a demand of globalization, which is important for the stabilizing of national perspectives. Only if you are able to relate your national identity adequately to others you can benefit from cosmopolitan views and, at the same time, preserve your specific national characteristic. The conclusions for a journalism of historical issues have not yet been drawn.

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TRUYỀN THÔNG VÀ SỰ ĐỊNH HÌNH KÝ ỨC TRONG QUÁ TRÌNH TOÀN CẦU HÓA: QUAN ĐIỂM XUYÊN QUỐC GIA VỀ LỊCH SỬ Ở CHÂU ÂU

*GS, TS Juergen Grimm**

Khi định nghĩa cái gì làm nên “một quốc gia”, Anthony Smith liệt kê ra những tính năng cấu thành sau: “Dân số người được đặt tên cùng chia sẻ một lãnh thổ lịch sử, sự kỳ bí, những ký ức lịch sử, một nền văn hóa công cộng, một nền kinh tế chung, cũng như những quyền lợi và trách nhiệm pháp lý chung cho tất cả các thành viên” (Smith, 1991: 14). Ông nhấn mạnh, nguồn gốc dân tộc và cũng theo Anderson (1983-2006) - thì những khía cạnh cấu thành nên quốc gia gắn liền với lịch sử theo ba cách: qua những truyền thống địa phương, qua những câu chuyện về nguồn gốc và qua việc lưu truyền các sự kiện có ý nghĩa trong quá khứ. Nếu không có kỷ niệm, một cộng đồng sẽ không có định hướng cho hiện tại và cũng không thể đưa ra được những khái niệm cho tương lai. Lãnh thổ, nền kinh tế và những hệ thống chính trị là “phần cứng”, nền văn hóa công cộng - được hình thành và truyền đạt qua truyền thông - là “phần mềm” của bản sắc dân tộc. Toàn cầu hóa nền kinh tế (Castells, 2000-2001) và toàn cầu hóa dòng chảy thông tin trong báo chí, truyền hình và đặc biệt mạnh mẽ nhất trong môi trường Internet ngày càng tạo điều kiện cho việc giải thích lịch sử. Đó cũng là thách thức cho tất cả các quốc gia, vừa coi đó là một nguồn lực làm giàu, nhưng cũng lại vừa là một yếu tố làm ảnh hưởng tới sự ổn định quốc gia.

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